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"TO BE OR NOT TO BE A PARENT?'
THE SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION TO CUSTODY
DISPUTES OVER FROZEN EMBRYOS
"Be fruitful and multiply, and replenish the earth."2 Scripture's
first commandment is to produce children. It should not be
surprising, therefore, that those who cannot have children have
received sympathetic treatment in Jewish literature as far back as
the Old Testament. Genesis tells the story of Sarah, Abraham's
barren wife, who was so distraught over her inability to have
children that she urged Abraham to take on a concubine for
purposes of producing a child. God subsequently took pity on
Sarah, blessing her with a child of her own.4
Contemporary research confirms the claims of the infertile on
the sympathy of those more fortunate.5 Infertility often erodes
one's self-esteem, causes feelings of guilt and isolation, and leads
to marital strife. 6 Traditionally, infertile couples were faced with a
choice: either remain childless or adopt.7  Recent advances,
however, in reproductive science and technology have profoundly
'Kass v. Kass, 235 A.D.2d 150, 168, 663 N.Y.S.2d 581, 593 (2d Dep't 1997)
(Miller, J., dissenting), aft'd, 91 N.Y.2d 554, 696 N.E.2d 174, 673 N.Y.S.2d 350
(1998).
2 Genesis 1:28.
3 Genesis 16:1-4. Sarah said to Abraham "Behold now, the Lord hath
restrained me from bearing; go in, I pray thee, unto my handmaid; it may be that
I shall be builded up through her." Genesis 16:2. The commentaries explain
that this passage teaches us that one who is childless is not "built up" but is
"broken down." Id.
4 Genesis 21:2. Sarah gave birth to a child at the age of ninety. Id.
5 Keith Alan Byers, Infertility and In Vitro Fertilization, 18 J. LEGAL MED.
265, 270 (1997). Infertility has been described to exist "when a couple have not
achieved a pregnancy after one year of regular unprotected sexual intercourse."
Id. at 266 (citations omitted). "[I]t has been estimated that as many as 28
million couples in the United States experienced reproduction problems in the
late 1980's." Id.
6 Id. at 270 (discussing the profound effects of infertility including isolation
and self-doubt). See also Marcia Joy Wurmbrand, Note, Frozen Embryos:
Moral, Social, and Legal Implications, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1079, 1079 n.1
(1986) (citing Menning, The Emotional Needs of Infertile Couples. 34
FERTILITY AND STERILrrY 313, 314-17 (1980)).
7 However, adoption can be very costly and the waiting period for adopting a
healthy child can be many years.
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altered the ability of infertile couples to produce a child of their
own. 8 With these new developments, many couples have been
given hope where none had existed for years.9
As a result of these new technologies, our society is witnessing a
reproductive revolution. In the past two decades, a grandmother
gave birth to her grandchildren;"0 a 59 year-old woman gave birth
to a child;" and an embryologist in Scotland cloned the first
mammal, a sheep named Dolly. 2  Cryopreservation has made
possible much of this reproductive technology. This process
involves freezing embryos created through in vitro fertilization, 3
the fertilization of eggs by sperm outside the body in an unnatural
environment.1 4 The embryos so created are later implanted in a
womb. 5 The first successful birth from a cyropreserved embryo
8 See John Robertson, Assisted Reproductive Technology and The Family, 47
HASTINGS L.J. 911 (1996) (discussing the growing use of assisted reproductive
techniques to help childless couples form families, including "intrauterine
insemination, ovulation induction, in vitro fertilization, intracytoplasmic sperm
injection, sperm donation, egg donation, embryo donation, and gestational
surrogacy.").
9 "Although adoption and foster parenting can provide parenting experiences,
only [assisted reproductive technologies] enable one or both partners to have
some biologic tie, either genetic or gestational, to their children." See
Robertson, supra note 8, at 912.
o See John D. Battersby, South African Woman Gives Birth to 3
Grandchildren, N.Y. TIMES, Oct 2, 1987, at A9.
" See, A 50 Year old Woman Becomes a Mother, USA TODAY, Jan. 7, 1994, at
IIA.
2 See Sharon Begley, Little Lamb, Who Made Thee? NEWSWEEK, Mar. 10,
1997, at 53-54.
"3 See Byers, supra note 5, at 272-73. See also Peter J. Neumann, Should
Health Insurance Cover IVF? Issue & Options, 22 J. HEALTH POL'Y & L. 1215
(1997). In vitro fertilization has advanced "from the realm of science fiction to
become a regularly performed treatment for couples experiencing persistent
fertility problems. In Vitro fertilization is performed 50,000 times a year in
some three hundred facilities in the United States." Byers, supra note 5, at
1215.
" WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 637 (1983). The term
"in vitro" is defined as "outside the living body and in an artificial
environment." Id.
15 See Robertson, supra note 8, at 1083. The embryos are frozen in liquid
nitrogen at a "two-, four-, or eight-cell stage of development, since earlier stage
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was reported in 1984 in Melbourne, Australia. 6 Much progress
has been recorded since.
For decades, the issue of reproductive rights has been at the
forefront not only in science, but also in politics." Abortion and
contraception issues have challenged ethical and moral beliefs."8
For many, the United States Supreme Court decisions in abortion
and contraception cases "marked a victorious end to one phase" of
a long struggle for reproductive freedom.'9  The successful
development of in vitro fertilization in the 1980's, however,
ushered in a new era of unique legal and ethical issues, such as the
legal status of pre-embryos, inheritance rights, and posthumous use
of the reproductive material. ' One very new issue relates to the
embryos are more difficult to freeze, and later stage embryos are too advanced
to develop normally after thawing." Robertson, supra note 8, at 1083-84.6 See Byers, supra note 5, at 273. The embryo was frozen and stored for two
months prior to implantation in the mother's womb. N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1984,
at A16, col. 4.
" See Christine Feiler, Human Embryo Experimentation: Regulation and
Relative Rights, 66 FoRDHAM L. REV. 2345 (1998). See also Gina Kolata.
Scientists Report First Cloning Ever of Adult Mammal: Feat Is Shock to
Experts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1997, at A6.
8 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1977); Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
'9 John Robertson, Procreative Liberty and The Control of Conception.
Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 405 (1983) (noting that
"[w]omen in the United States began their long struggle for reproductive
freedom with the birth control movement of the mid-nineteenth century'").
20 See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 793 P.2d 479
(1990) (refusing to grant Moore property rights in his own genetic materials);
Del Zio v. Columbia Presbyterian Medical Center, No. 74-3558, slip op.
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1978). In Del Zio, the court held that a preimplantation
embryo was not the property of the couple who provided the sperm and egg. Id.
Nevertheless, the couple was awarded $500,00 for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Id. See also Wurmbrand, supra note 6, at 1079 n. 18. In her
article, Wurmbrand discussed the first case to address the issue of the legal
status of an embryo. Id. Unable to conceive, the Rios' traveled to Australia in
order to attempt in vitro fertilization. Id. Two of the eggs were frozen.
Subsequently, the Rios' died in a plane crash. Id. The fate of the embryos was
decided by the government in favor of adoption. Id. See Helene S. Shapo,
Matters of Life and Death: Inheritance Consequences of Reproductive
Technologies, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1091 (1997) (analyzing the consequences of
inheritance to children born from the use of reproductive technologies).
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disposition of frozen embryos."' Courts have been asked to
determine the ownership disposition of cryopreserved embryos
where no specific provision has been made for them in case of
divorce. 2 This note examines the custody battles over the frozen
embryos. Part I briefly describes in vitro fertilization and embryo
cryopreservation. Part II examines the relevant case law. Part III
discusses the constitutional right to privacy generally. Finally, Part
IV applies the right to privacy to these disputes and suggests that a
resolution requires the balancing of competing interests of the
parties. This note will argue that the party wishing to avoid
reproduction should generally prevail if the other party has other
reasonable alternatives to reproduce.
I. REPRODUCTION WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF TECHNOLOGY
"More than one in eight married couples in the United States
suffers from infertility."'23 Although adoption is an alternative,
many couples now seek help from reproductive technologies. In
vitro fertilization is in especially wide use and has been called "one
of the most important advances in reproductive medicine in this
century."24 Although scientists have used in vitro fertilization for
many years in animals, the first human birth resulting from in vitro
21 See infra notes 50-115 and accompanying text.
22 Other debates have included determination of the legal status of the frozen
embryo, determination of disposition of the frozen embryos after both of the
gamete providers died and whether joint directives for disposition are legally
binding. See Christine A. Djalleta, A Twinkle in A Decedent's Eye: Proposed
Amendments To The Uniform Probate Code in Light of New Reproductive
Technology, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 335 (1994) (discussing the "ownership" of frozen
embryos after the death of one or both of the gamete providers).
23 See Robertson, supra note 8, at 911 (citing OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, INFERTILITY: MEDICAL AND SOCIAL CHOICES 3
(1988) (defining infertility as "a lack of pregnancy after a year of unprotected
intercourse."). See also Byers, supra note 5, at 266 (estimating that in the late
1980's, as many as twenty-eight million couples in the United States
experienced problems in reproduction).
24 See Byers, supra note 5, at 272 (quoting CHEN, OOCYTE FREEZING, IN
CLINICAL IN VITRO FERTILIZATION 113 (C. Wood & A. Trounson eds. 2d ed.
1989)).
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fertilization was in 1978 in England.2 Louise Brown, a normal
healthy baby, was conceived in a petri dish making her the world's
first "test tube" baby.26
The in vitro fertilization procedure is particularly useful when a
woman is unable to conceive in utero due to a blockage in her
fallopian tubes.27 The procedure, which takes about two weeks,
involves retrieving mature eggs from a woman and fertilizing the
eggs with sperm in vitro.' During the protocol, the woman is
treated with hormones in order to induce ovulation and produce an
increased number of eggs. 9 When suitable eggs are retrieved, they
are combined with the man's sperm." This fertilization takes
place in a culture dish for a particular incubation period. The
resulting embryos are transferred back to the uterus for
implantation.3 ' During the treatment, a doctor may fertilize more
embryos than will actually be implanted. In about twelve weeks,
the doctor can determine if the procedure worked and the woman
is pregnant.3
In the twenty years of in vitro fertilization availability, over
35,000 babies in the United States have been born through this
technique.3 The development has been especially popular since
21 The First Test Tube Baby, TIME, July 31, 1978 at 58.
261 Id. at 62. See also Byers supra note 5, at 272. In 1981, Elizabeth Jane Can-,
America's first "test tube" baby, was born in Norfolk, Virginia. Id
27 See Clifton Perry & L. Kristen Schneider, Cryopreserved Embryos: Who
Shall Decide Their Fate?, 13 J. LEGAL MED. 463 (1992). For more information
about in vitro fertilization, see generally Byers, supra note 5, at 277-78.
Infertility can result from various factors, including age, medication that a
partner may be taking, a chronic disease, or a physical condition. Moreover,
infrequent ovulation or low male sperm count are often blamed for causing
infertility. Id. at 266.
21 See Perry, supra note 27, at 467.
29 See id.
I Id. During the procedure, the woman is placed under general anesthesia and
several incisions are made in her abdomen. Id. A laparscope and a needle are
inserted into the abdomen to retrieve the eggs. Id. An alternative to laparscopy
is ultrasound-directed needle aspiration. Id.
31 id.
32 id.
33 See ARTHUR KAPLAN, DUE CONSIDERATION: CONTROVERSY IN THE AGE OF
MEDICAL MIRACLES (1998).
1998 309
5
Schonfeld: Frozen Embryos
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1999
TOURO LAW REVIEW
1981 when doctors in London announced the development of a
procedure by which embryos created through in vitro fertilization
can be frozen in a cryogenic state for later implantation.' There
are several advantages to cryopreservation. 35 First, physicians can
postpone the implantation of the embryo.36 Second, in vitro
fertilization is costly,37  time consuming, and physically
demanding. 38 After all the tests, injections and preparation, in vitro
fertilization may result in eight to twelve eggs.39  Electing to
fertilize and freeze the surplus eggs avoids repeating the painful
3 See Perry, supra note 27, at 463.
15 See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, INFERTILITY
:MEDICAL AND SOCIAL CHOICES 3 (1988). See Perry, supra note 27, at 468.
During Cryopreservation, the embryos are frozen in liquid nitrogen at a
temperature of minus 195 degrees centigrade because "at this temperature, the
fertilized ova can safely be preserved in a suspended biological state." Id.
(citations omitted).
36See Wurmbrand, supra note 6, at 1083.
3 See Byers, supra note 5, at 285. "On average, the cost incurred per
successful delivery with in vitro fertilization increases from $66,667 for the first
cycle of in vitro fertilization to $114,286 by the sixth cycle." Id. Due to the
probability that the initial in vitro fertilization cycle fails, couples chose to
undergo more than just the first cycle and " 'couples return for the $8,000 to
$10,000 procedure again and again."' Id. at 286 (quoting Librach, Struggle To
Conceive Has Emotional Price: Despite Setbacks, Infertile Couples Continue
Pursuit of Parenthood, ST. LOUIS DISPATCH, Jan. 29, 1995, at I D.)
38 See id. at 277. In his article, Professor John Robertson refers to the process
of in vitro fertilization as "a test of human endurance." Id. The process begins
with two weeks of daily drug injections. Id. The injections are painful and have
side effects. Id. Each day, the woman undergoes ultrasound examinations and
blood tests in order to monitor the ovaries so that the eggs can be removed at the
right time. Id.
31 Id. at 277. "Although the goal is to retrieve as many eggs as possible, this
goal must be weighed against the threat of endangering the woman's health.
Hyperstimulation of the ovaries can result in 'increasing patient discomfort and
morbidity."' Id. (quoting WOOD, THE CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE OF
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY IN THE FEMALE, IN IMPLANTATION IN
MAMMALS 277, 278 (1993)). Nevertheless, it is advantageous to retrieve many
eggs because of the "correlation between the number of fertilized eggs
ultimately transferred to a woman's uterus and the pregnancy rate." Id. at 278.
Moreover, "[rietrieving a larger number of eggs increases the likelihood that
more fertilized embryo might exist for transfer to the woman's body." Id.
310 [Vol 15
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procedure, discomfort, time and cost involved in extracting eggs
from a woman each time in vitro fertilization is attempted.'
For some, electing to freeze an embryo may be a necessity.4
The physician may wish to postpone implantation when a woman
is unable to undergo a second laparoscopy, or foresees possible
radiation or other treatment that may damage her ovaries or cause a
genetic defect in her eggs.42 Cryopreservation is now available
around the world.43
Although it provides a solution to the infertility problem faced
by many couples, cryopreservation also provides a myriad of
moral, legal and ethical dilemmas.' One such dilemma involves
the disposition of frozen embryos.45 Several cases illustrate the
difficulties the judicial system faces in attempting to resolve these
disputes.
II. THE DEBATES
The few cases that have dealt with in vitro fertilization have
provoked much public interest and legal commentary. They deal
in large part with the issue of who should determine the disposition
of frozen embryos when the gamete providers have not agreed as
to their disposition. Due to the lack of comprehensive legislation
in this area, courts have much discretion when deciding these
cases.' Some courts have focused on whether a frozen embryo is
4 See id at 1084. See also John Robertson. Embryos, Families, and
Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of The New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL.
L. REv. 939, 949 (1986).
"' Wurmbrand, supra note 6, at 1084.
42 See id.
" See Byers, supra note 5, at 265.
44See Wurmbrand, supra note 6, at 1081 (exploring some of the controversies
surrounding frozen embryos). See also Christine A. Djalleta, A Twinkle in A
Decedent's Eye: Proposed Amendments To The Uniform Probate Code in Light
of New Reproductive Technology, 67 TEMP. L. REv. 335 (1994) (discussing the
"ownership" of preembryos after the death of the gamete providers).
5 The cryogenically-preserved product of an in vitro fertilization is
alternatively referred to as "pre-embryos," "pre-zygotes," and "frozen embryos."
I See Kass v. Kass, 91 N.Y.2d 554, 696 N.E.2d 174, 673 N.Y.S.2d 350
(1998). Chief Justice Kaye noted:
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considered a person, property, 47 or entitled to special respect. 4
Others, in an effort to avoid this question, have been looking to
contract principles.49 Still other courts have weighed the interests
of both gamete providers. The following cases are representative
of the issues facing the courts.
a. York v. Jones
One of the first cases to deal directly with a dispute between a
couple and an in vitro fertilization clinic over custody of frozen
embryos was York v. Jones." When the Yorks entered a Virginia
clinic to undergo in vitro fertilization they signed a consent form
Proliferating cases regarding the disposition of embryos, as
well as other assisted reproduction issues, will unquestionably
spark further progression of the law. What is plain, however,
is the need for clear, consistent principles to guide parties in
protecting their interests and resolving their disputes, and the
need for particular care in fashioning such principles as issues
are better defined and appreciated.
Id. at 564, 696 N.E.2d at 179, 673 N.Y.S.2d at 355. See also Kass v. Kass, 235
A.D.2d 150, 673 N.Y.S.2d 581 (2d Dep't 1997). In his dissent, Justice Miller
noted that the "legal, emotional, and ethical nightmare" resulting from these
frozen embryo disputes proves the need for legislation mandating in vitro
fertilization clinics to require signed agreements stating the parties' intentions in
the event there is a change in circumstance. Id. at 168, 673 N.Y.S.2d at 594
(Miller, J., dissenting).
" York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D.Va. 1989) (discussing the confused
state of jurisprudence regarding defining an embryo). Compare York, 717 F.
Supp. at 421 (acknowledging that embryos were considered "'property' for
purposes of a 'cryopreservation agreement') with Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d
588, 590 (Tenn. 1992) (concluding that the status of the frozen embryos was
between that of person and property). See also Stephanie J. Owens,
Establishing Guidelines for Resolving Disputes Over Frozen Embryos, 10 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L.& POL'Y 493, 507 (1993) (discussing the person v.
property debate over frozen embryos).
4 See Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society, Ethical
Considerations of Assisted Reproductive Technologies, Vol 62, No.5, (Nov.
1994), at Ch. 10, p. 33S.
" Kass v. Kass, 91 N.Y.2d 554, 696 N.E.2d 174, 673 N.Y.S.2d 350 (1998)
(relying on contract principles to resolve the dispute).
'0 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989).
[Vol 15312
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agreement which detailed their rights to the frozen embryos.5'
Several months later, one embryo was cryogenically preserved.'
Ultimately, the Yorks moved to California and sought the release
and transfer of the last cyropreserved embryo from the clinic in
Virginia to another in vitro fertilization clinic in California.' The
Virginia clinic refused to transfer the remaining embryo.' The
Yorks filed suit in federal court in Virginia and the defendants
moved to dismiss.' The court found that the agreement created a
valid bailor-bailee relationship between the Yorks and the clinic.
5 6
The court stated that embryos were considered property for
purposes of such contracts." The court denied defendants' motion,
reasoning that the Yorks had in fact stated a cause of action.5"
st Id. The consent form provided in pertinent part:
We may withdraw our consent and discontinue participation at
any time without prejudice .... We have the principle
responsibility to decide the disposition of our pre-
zygotes .... Should we for any reason no longer wish to
attempt to initiate a pregnancy, we understand we may choose
one of three fates for our pre-zygotes that remain in frozen
storage. Our pre-zygotes may be: 1) donated to another
infertile couple (who will remain unknown to us) 2) donated
for approved research investigation 3) thawed but not allowed
to undergo further development.
Id.
52Id
53 Id.
I Id The defendants argued that the Yorks agreed to have the procedure done
only in Virginia and their proprietary rights to the frozen embryos were limited
to the three "fates" set forth in the Cryopreservation Agreement. Id. at 427.
55 Id. at 423. Plaintiffs' complaint alleged "breach of contract, quasi-contract;
detinue and 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Id. at 423. The defendants moved to dismiss
the complaint "for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Id.
56 Id. at 425. Although the parties did not expressly create a bailment, under
Virginia law, all that is required "is the element of lawful possession however
created, and duty to account for the thing as the property of another that creates
the bailment." Id. (citing Crandall v. Woodward, 206 Va. 321, 143 S.E.2d 923
(1965)).
1 Id. "The essential nature of a bailment relationship imposes on the bailee,
when the purpose of the bailment has terminated, an absolute obligation to
return the subject matter of the bailment to the bailor." Id. (citing 8 AM. JUR.2D
Bailments § 178 (1980)).
581d. at 427.
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Shortly thereafter, the case settled and the Yorks were permitted to
transfer their remaining frozen embryo to the California clinic. 9
This, of course, is the easy case.
b. Davis v. Davis
Davis v. Davis,6° decided by the Supreme Court of Tennessee, is
the first case to "attempt to lay out an analytical framework for
disputes between a divorcing couple regarding the disposition of
frozen embryos.' In Davis, Junior Lewis Davis filed for divorce
against Mary Sue Davis. The couple agreed to the terms of
marriage dissolution except for "who was to have 'custody' of the
seven 'frozen embryos' stored in a Knoxville fertility clinic that
had attempted to assist the Davises in achieving a much-wanted
pregnancy."'62 Initially, Mrs. Davis requested custody of the
embryos for the purpose of having them implanted in her uterus,
while Mr. Davis opposed any implantation until he determined
"whether or not he wanted to become a parent outside the bounds
of marriage." 6 Eventually, the parties' positions changed; Mrs.
Davis wanted to donate the embryos to a childless couple and Mr.
Davis wanted the embryos to be discarded. 64 Davis proceeded
through three levels of the Tennessee judicial system, with each
court arriving at an entirely different conclusion.
The trial court awarded custody to Mrs. Davis, concluding that
the embryos were "human beings."'65 The appellate court reversed
" See John Robertson, In The Beginning: The Legal Status Of Early Embryos,
76 VA. L. REv. 437,463 (1990).
6' 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
6! Kass v. Kass, 91 N.Y.2d 554, 563, 696 N.E.2d 174, 178, 673 N.Y.S.2d 350,
354 (1998).62 Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 589.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 590.
' Id. at 589. See also Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 WVL 140495, (Tenn.
Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989) rev'd, No. 180, 1990 WL 130807 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept.
13, 1990), afld, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992). The trial court judge instructed
"it is the manifest Best Interest of the Children, in vitro, that they be made
available for implantation to assure their opportunity for live birth; implantation
is their sole and only hope for survival." Id. at * 11.
314 [Vol 15
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and awarded "joint control.. and equal voice over their
disposition" to both Mr. Davis and Mrs. Davis.' The appellate
court reasoned that Mr. Davis had a "constitutionally protected
right not to beget a child where no pregnancy has taken place."'67
Furthermore, the court found "no compelling state interest to
justify ordering implantation against the will of either party."'
The Supreme Court of Tennessee began its analysis by
attempting to clarify the legal status of the pre-embryo. 69 The
court concluded that the pre-embryos were not persons or property,
but in a special category that deserved "special respect because of
their potential for human life."7 Therefore, according to the court,
the parties had equal decision-making authority over the
disposition of the pre-embryos.7 Next, the court discussed
"whether the parties will become parents."" The court examined
the right to privacy and concluded that "the right of procreational
autonomy is composed of two rights of equal significance - the
right to procreate and the right to avoid procreation."' After
balancing these two conflicting constitutional interests, the court
concluded that Mr. Davis' interest in avoiding genetic parenthood
outweighed Mrs. Davis' right to procreate by donating the embryos
to another couple.74 The court, however, noted that "the case
61 Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 589.
67See Davis v. Davis, 1990 WL 130807 at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990),
aft'd, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
61 Id. at *2-*3.
69 Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 594. "One of the fundamental issues the inquiry poses
is whether the pre-embryos in this case should be considered 'persons' or
'property' in the contemplation of the law." Id.
70Id at 597.
71 Id.
PId. at 598.
73 Id. at 601.
74 Id. at 604.
Refusal to permit donation of the pre-embryos would impose
on [Mary Sue Davis] the burden of knowing that the lengthy
IVF procedures she underwent were futile, and that the
preembryos to which she contributed genetic material would
never become children. While this is not an insubstantial
emotional burden, we can only conclude that Mary Sue Davis'
interest in donation is not as significant as the interest Junior
1998 315
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would be closer if Mary Sue Davis was seeking to use the embryos
herself, but only if she could not achieve parenthood by any other
reasonable means."'75 The court commented that any proposed
state interest in preserving the life of the embryo "is at best slight,"
reasoning that:
when weighed against the interests of the
individuals and the burdens inherent in parenthood,
the state's interest in the potential life of these pre-
embryos is not sufficient to justify any infringement
upon the freedom of these individuals to make their
own decisions as to whether to allow a process to
continue that may result in such a dramatic change
in their lives as becoming parents.7 6
Thus, according to Davis, the right to avoid genetic parenthood is a
"fundamental" right."7 One commentator noted "by finding that
the right to avoid genetic procreation is fundamental, the Davis
court established a barrier to state regulation in this area. ' '7 1 Under
this analysis, any attempt at regulation would be subject to a strict
scrutiny analysis, "requiring that the means be necessary, or
narrowly tailored, to meet a compelling state interest. '79 However,
the United States Supreme Court has not recognized the right to
avoid procreation as "fundamental," therefore for now, any law
bearing on such a right will be subject to a rational basis test.8"
Davis has in avoiding parenthood. If she were allowed to
donate these preembryos, he would face a lifetime of either
wondering about his parental status or knowing about his
parental status but having no control over it.
Id.
7 Id.
76 Id. at 602.
77 Robert Muller, Davis v. Davis: The Applicability of Privacy and Property
Rights to the Disposition of Frozen Preembryos in Intrafamilial Disputes, 24 U.
TOL. L. REV. 763, 784-85 (1993).
7 1 Id. at 785.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 786. See also John Robertson, In the Beginning: The Legal Status of
Early Embryos, 76 VA. L. REV. 437, 500 (1990) (arguing that the United States
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c. Kass v. Kass
Kass v. Kass,"l another divorce case, dealt with the disposition of
five frozen embryos.' The couple had sought the assistance of an
in vitro fertilization clinic, 83 which required the parties to sign
consent forms.' Several attempts at in vitro fertilization failed, but
not all of the embryos had been used. The remaining embryos
were frozen for future use.' Shortly thereafter, the parties filed for
divorce. s6 The divorce decree provided that the frozen embryos
would be disposed of in the manner specified in the consent form
and neither party could claim custody over the embryos.' A court
action ensued after Mrs. Kass notified the hospital that she wanted
possession of the embryos.' The trial court awarded custody of
the embryos to Mrs. Kass reasoning that a husband's rights in in
Supreme Court is not likely to recognize the right to avoid procreation as a
fundamental right).
81 91 N.Y.2d 554,696 N.E.2d 174, 673 N.Y.S.2d 350 (1998).
8' Id. at 557, 696 N.E.2d at 175, 673 N.Y.S.2d at 351.
83id.
"Id. at 558-60, 696 N.E.2d at 176-77, 673 N.Y.S.2d at 352-53. The consent
part provided in pertinent part: "In the event of divorce, we understand that legal
ownership of any stored pre-zygotes must be determined in a property
settlement and will be released as directed by order of a court of competent
jurisdiction." Id. at 559, 696 N.E.2d at 176, 673 N.Y.S.2d at 352. A second part
of the consent form provided in pertinent part:
In the event that we... are unable to make a decision
regarding the disposition of our stored, frozen pre-zygotes, we
now indicate our desire for the disposition of our pre-zygotes
and direct the IVF program to: ... (b) Our frozen pre-zygotes
may be examined by the IVF program for biological studies
and be disposed of by the IVF Program for approved research
investigation as determined by the IVF program.
Id. at 559-69, 696 N.E.2d at 176-77, 673 N.Y.S.2d at 353-54.
8' Id. at 560, 696 N.E.2d at 177, 673 N.Y.S.2d at 353.
MId.
87 id.
I Kass v. Kass, 1995 VL 110368, at *4 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County Jan 18,
1995), rev'd, 235 A.D.2d 150, 663 N.Y.S.2d 581 (2d Dep't 1997), afJ'd. 91
N.Y.2d 554, 696 N.E.2d 174, 673 N.Y.S.2d 350 (1998). Mrs. Kass wished to
have the embryos implanted into her uterus. Kass, 1995 VL 110368, at *2.
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vitro fertilization are no greater than his rights in in vivo
fertilization. 89
The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision and held
that the consent agreement signed by the parties unequivocally set
forth the parties' intent and governed the disposition of the frozen
embryos.' Moreover, the court concluded, a woman's right to
bodily integrity is not implicated "in the IVF scenario until such
time as implantation actually occurs."9'
According to the concurring opinion, the consent agreement
should not have been relied upon to resolve the dispute because it
did not provide "real insight" into the true intentions of the parties
and was "susceptible of multiple and conflicting interpretations.
' ' 2
The concurrence opined that where there is no agreement declaring
the party's intention, "the objecting party, except in the most
exceptional circumstances, should be able to veto a former
spouse's proposed implantation."93
The dissenting opinion agreed with the concurrence that the
informed consent agreements failed to provide a clear statement of
the parties' intent.' Rejecting any presumption in favor of either
party, the dissent instead held that the competing rights, equities,
and circumstances of both parties should be balanced: 9' "The
immediate question before us is whether the burdens of unwanted
paternity of the 'would-not-be father' exceed the deprivation to the
'would-be-mother' in this case."' Since the record did not contain
'9 Id. at *4.
90 Kass v. Kass, 235 A.D.2d 150, 158, 663 N.Y.S.2d 581, 588 (2d Dep't 1997),
af'd, 91 N.Y.2d 554, 696 N.E.2d 174, 673 N.Y.S.2d 350 (1998). "Accordingly,
their prior statements as to disposition, as set forth at page six of the informed
consent document, should be given effect according to its clear and
unambiguous terms." Id.
9' Id. at 155, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 586.
92 Id. at 163, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 591 (Friedmann, J., concurring).
93 Id. at 165, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 592 (Friedmann, J., concurring) (relying on the
constitutional principles involving the right to procreate and the right to avoid
procreation).
'4 Id. at 180, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 601 (Miller, J. dissenting).
95 Id. at 168, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 594 (Miller, J. dissenting).
96 Id. at 178, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 600 (Miller, J. dissenting) (discussing "diverse
factors" that the court should consider when making this assessment).
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sufficient information to balance adequately the competing
interests of the parties, the dissent would have remitted the case
back to the lower court for further proceedings.'
The New York Court of Appeals unanimously held that the
parties had clearly intended that in case of divorce and
disagreements, the pre-zygotes would be donated to the clinic for
research.98 Relying on Davis, the Court held that "agreements
between progenitors, or gamete donors, regarding disposition of
their pre-zygotes should generally be presumed valid and binding,
and enforced in any dispute between them." The court reasoned
that such advance directives minimize any misunderstandings and
maximize each party's procreative liberty by reserving to them the
authority to make such personal and private decisions." ' Because
the Court relied upon the agreement, it found no need to determine
whether the pre-zygotes are entitled to "special respect."' 0'
However, the court did conclude that the pre-zygotes are not
"persons" for constitutional purposes.'02
d. J.B.v.MB.
Most recently, in JB. v. M.B.,0 3 the Superior Court of New
Jersey was asked to decide the fate of seven frozen embryos. The
couple's attempts to conceive naturally were unsuccessful, so they
97Id. at 169, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 594 (Miller, J. dissenting).
9891 N.Y.2d 554, 565,696 N.E.2d 174, 180, 673 N.Y.S.2d 350, 355 (1998).
9 Id. at 565, 696 N.E.2d at 180, 673 N.Y.S.2d at 356 (citing Davis v. Davis,
842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992)).
100 Id. The appellant argued that the consent forms were ambiguous. Id. at
566, 696 N.E.2d at 180, 673 N.Y.S.2d at 356. Applying general contract
principles, the court rejected this argument and concluded that "the informed
consents signed by both parties unequivocally manifested their mutual intention
that in the present circumstances the pre-zygotes be donated for research." Id. at
567, 696 N.E.2d at 181, 673 N.Y.S.2d at 357.
101 Id. at 564-65, 696 N.E.2d at 179, 673 N.Y.S.2d at 355.
10 Id.
'
03J.B. v. M.B., 04-95-97 (N.J.Super. Ct., Sept. 28, 1998).
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opted for in vitro fertilization.'O A consent form with the clinic
was executed.0 5 After the procedure had begun, the wife
discovered that she was pregnant naturally."° The couple decided
to preserve the embryos by cryopreservation.' 7 When, several
months after the birth of their baby girl, the couple separated,' the
wife sought to have the embryos discarded. The husband
disagreed, arguing that his religious conviction prevented such an
act.'°9
The court employed a balancing test similar to that suggested in
Davis. Utilizing what it referred to as a "Raison d'etre"' 0
analysis, the court examined the reasons why the parties undertook
the in vitro fertilization procedure."' Judge Laskin concluded that
the parties did not go through the process "with the idea in mind to
begin an enterprise of selling or donating embryos to other
couples."'"1 2 Accordingly, the court granted the wife's motion for
"o Id. at 3. The couple's infertility problems were due to the blockage of the
wife's fallopian tubes. Id. at 2. There were no infertility problems attributed to
the husband. Id
105 Id. The consent form provided in pertinent part: "The control and
disposition of the frozen embryos belongs to the patient and her partner.... The
I.V.F. team will not be obligated to proceed with the transfer of any
cryopreserved embryos if experience indicated the risks outweigh the benefits."
Id. Attached to the consent form was a legal statement executed by the parties
which provided in pertinent part that they "agree that all control, direction and
ownership of our tissues will be relinquished to the I.V.F. Program under the
following circumstances: a dissolution of our marriage by Court order, unless
the Court order specified who takes control and direction of the tissues." Id.
'06 Id. at 3.
107 id.
'
0
' Id. at 4.
"o Id. The husband wanted to use the embryos himself or donate them to
another couple. Id. According to the husband, the frozen embryos were "living
entities" which should have been preserved. Id.
. "oRaison d'etre is a French expression which means "reason to be" or "reason
for being." Id. The court asked the following questions: "Why did the parties in
this case, undertake the IVF procedure? What was the reason for the
undertaking of the IVF procedure?" Id. at 6.
"' Id. The court found that the couple had been happily married, the wife was
infertile, the husband was not infertile and in vitro fertilization was the answer to
their problems. Id.
2 Id. According to Judge Laskin "this was not the Raison d'etre." Id.
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summary judgment, basing its decision on several factors. First,
the couple had a child naturally; second, the parties were divorced;
and, last, the husband, the party who wished to preserve the
embryos, had the ability to have more children with another
woman."3 Though the judge stated he would not rule on the issue
of when life begins, he did say that he had no hesitation ruling that
the cyropreserved embryos "are not living entities."""
In JB., in sum, it was the party who had no infertility problem
who wanted to keep the frozen embryos." 5 In such a case, it seems
clear that the interests of the one who wishes to avoid procreation
outweigh the interests of the one who wishes to procreate.
Il. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY:
CRYOPRESERVATION AND PROCREATIVE LIBERTY
Under the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, no
person shall be "deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law.""' 6 Over the years, the Supreme Court has
expanded the meaning of "liberty""' 7 to include the right to
privacy.!" In Meyer v. Nebraska,"9 the United States Supreme
Court declared that the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment includes "the right of the individual.., to marry,
establish a home and bring up children.., and generally to enjoy
113 id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 J.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
117 See infra notes 116-135 and accompanying text.
"
8 The right to privacy was originally enunciated by Samuel Warren and Louis
D. Brandeis at the turn of the last century. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193, 95 (1890). Fifty years
later, the Supreme Court began to recognize such a right. See, e.g.. Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (holding that an Oklahoma law, which
authorized sterilization, violated equal protection); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,
522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that a statute violated due process
because it imposed upon the "privacy" of marriage).
19 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."'"2
In Griswold v. Connecticut,'2 ' the United States Supreme Court
explicitly recognized the existence of the right to privacy. Justice
Douglas, writing for the Court, held that "specific guarantees in the
Bill of Rights have penumbras" and it was these specific
guarantees, the majority believed, that created a "zone of
privacy."'" Griswold struck down a state prohibition on the use of
contraception as unconstitutionally intruding "upon the right of
marital privacy."'' Following Griswold, the United StatesSupreme Court extended the right to privacy to a number of
substantive areas.124 While Griswold shielded the privacy of
married couples, Eisenstadt v. Baird"2 extended the right of
privacy to unmarried individuals. 26 In Eisenstadt, the Court stated
that the "right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted government intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision to bear or beget a child."' 7
In Roe v. Wade, 21 the Supreme Court relied on the right toprivacy to invalidate a statute criminalizing abortion. The Court
concluded that the right of privacy "is broad enough to encompass
a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."129
Roe established that no individual should be denied the right toprocreate or compelled to procreate by State action. The Roe
Court declined to recognize an unborn fetus as a "person" under
120 Id. at 399.
121 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that a Connecticut statute banning the use of
contraceptive devices was unconstitutional).
2MId. at 484.
1 Id. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
124 See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Carey v. Population
Services, Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
25 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (invalidating a Massachusetts statute limiting the sale
of contraceptive devices to married individuals).
126Id. at 453.
127 id.
12' 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
129 Id. at 153.
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the federal and state constitutions.' From the Roe decision we
learn that since a "woman alone controls her bodily integrity; her
choice dictates the fate of a non-viable fetus."'' Nearly twenty
years later, the United States Supreme Court in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey,'32 held that a pregnant woman had a
protected liberty interest in deciding whether to continue her
pregnancy. 3 The Supreme Court recognized that abortion rights
are rooted in the right to privacy"3 and equal protection.' 3
The question yet to be resolved is whether these interests are
present when the court is asked to determine the fate of an embryo
not yet implanted, specifically, is this right to bodily integrity
implicated prior to implantation? 136
According to the Davis court, as we have seen, concerns about a
woman's bodily integrity are not applicable in the in vitro
'1o Id. at 158. "The unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons
in the whole sense." Id at 162.
13' Kass v. Kass, 235 A.D.2d 150, 176, 663 N.Y.S.2d 581, 599 (2d Dep't 1997)
(Miller, J., dissenting), af'd, 91 N.Y.2d 554, 696 N.E.2d 174, 673 N.Y.S.2d 350
(1998).
132 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
133 Id. at 851-52.
134 Id. at 851.
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, childrearing and education ... These matters,
involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may
make in his lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Id.
13 Id. at 852. The court found that "the mother who carries a child to full term
is subject to anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain that only she must bear."
Id. See also Radhika Rao, Reconceiving Privacy: Relationships and
Reproductive Technology, 45 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1077, 1110 (1998). According
to Professor Rao, the right to privacy is misunderstood because it is not attached
to individuals but "nurtures social institutions." Therefore, when there is
discord between the parties, the state is permitted to intervene in order to protect
both parties' interests. Id. at 1123. The State must balance the conflicting
interests based upon policy rather than constitutional principles. Id.
136Kass, 235 A.D.2d at 176, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 599 (Miller, J., dissenting).
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fertilization context. ,37 Davis recognized the right to procreate as
an integral part of one's right to privacy 38 and held that
"procreational autonomy is a right enjoyed by both females and
males and including the right to procreate or not to procreate.
'' 39
Accordingly, the court drew no distinction between female and
male gamete providers and viewed their rights as equal. Similarly,
in Kass, the court concluded that a "disposition of these pre-
zygotes does not implicate a woman's right of privacy or bodily
integrity in the area of reproductive choice.""
IV. CONCLUSION
Davis attempted to create a framework for cryopreservation
cases. As a starting point, Davis held that a court should first look
to the wishes of the progenitors as spelled out in a contract.1 4
1
According to the Davis court, albeit in dictum, any agreement
signed by the parties regarding disposition of the frozen embryos,
should be presumed valid and binding 42 If, however, no such
agreement exists, as was the case in Davis, then the court must
resolve the dispute by weighing the interests of both parties. In
such a case, the party "wishing to avoid procreation should prevail,
assuming that the other party has a reasonable possibility of
achieving parenthood by means other than use of the pre-embryos
in question."' 43 Since Mary Davis did not seek to use the frozen
embryos for herself she was unable to prevail under the balancing
'37 Id. at 601. Nevertheless, the court conceded that a woman contributes more
to the in vitro procedure than a man and the trauma to which a woman is
subjected is more severe than that of the man. Id.
138 Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 600 (Tenn. 1992). See Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (describing the right to procreate as an
individual's basic civil right).
139 Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 601.
t40 Kass v. Kass, 91 N.Y.2d 554, 564, 696 N.E.2d 174, 179, 673 N.Y.S.2d 350,
355 (1998).
141 Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604.
141 Id. at 597. "This conclusion is in keeping with the proposition that the
progenitors, having provided the gametic material giving rise to the preembryos,
retain decision-making authority as to their disposition." Id.
143 Id. at 604.
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approach. The court acknowledged that the case would be "closer"
had she wished to use them herself."
Kass is significant because it clearly established what Davis had
set out to do; prior directives are the key to resolving these
disputes. However, this author believes that this resolution is the
easy way out. In essence, according to Kass principles, "it's too
bad - you signed it, now you are bound." Therefore, the question
arises as to what happens when the consent forms are not
indicative of the parties' current intentions, that is, where the
interests of one of the parties changes.'45
In such cases, this author suggests that the courts should attempt
to reconcile the parties' conflicting interests by adopting a
balancing approach. If either party can show no other means to
procreate, the courts must consider the rights of both parties.
Although the Davis court adopted a presumption that the party
wishing to avoid procreation should normally prevail, the court left
open the possibility that the party who wishes to procreate may
have a more significant interest in certain circumstances. 16
The very fundamental nature of procreation leads to the
conclusion that contract principles should not govern. A contract
that precludes the possibility of having children should not be
enforceable. Rather, the court should consider the interests of both
parties. Therefore, where both parties signed consent forms but
their positions change to their detriment, the court should not look
to contract principles, but should weigh the parties' interests and
burdens. In Kass, Mrs. Kass did not provide the court with any
4 Id.
145 For example, a woman may have reached an age where she can no longer
carry a child or has developed a physical condition whereby she is unable to
undergo another in vitro fertilization procedure. See John Robertson, Prior
Agreements for Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 407 (1990)
(discussing the enforceability of the parties' prior agreement in order to regulate
the disposition of the parties' frozen embryos). In his article, Professor John
Robertson states that objection to enforcement of prior agreements arise because
the providers are asked to sign these directions for disposition of the embryos at
a time when those possibilities are highly abstract. Id. at 418. The specific need
of the parties may change so dramatically that it may seem "unfair" to hold them
to these decisions. Id.
i For example, if this is the party's last chance at becoming a parent.
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proof that this was her last chance of parenthood.'47 Perhaps if she
had done so, the court would have balanced her interest in
procreation against Mr. Kass's interest in avoiding procreation. As
she failed to do so, we will never know.
Esther M Schonfeld*
147 See, e.g., Kass v. Kass, 91 N.Y.2d 554, 564, 696 N.E.2d 174, 179, 673
N.Y.S.2d 350, 355 (1998). The Kass court rejected Mrs. Kass' argument that
the consent forms were ambiguous. Id. at 566, 696 N.E.2d at 180, 673 N.Y.S.2d
at 356. Applying common-law contract principles the court held that the
consent forms unequivocally manifested the intentions of both parties. that the
pre-zygotes be donated to the clinic for research. Id.
* The author would like to express her warmest gratitude to Professor Daniel
Subotnik for his invaluable comments on this article and to Judge Lawrence
Brennan for inspiring me to write this article. I would also like to thank my
children, Jeremy and Alexandra, for providing me with the most cherished years
of my life and making everything worthwhile. This article is dedicated to the
memory of my grandfather Moritz Weldler, who was fortunate to have two
children of his own, only to have them taken away and murdered by the Nazis.
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